Introduction
A single underscore in a namespace name was enough to break tenant isolation in Red Hat Quay, letting an authenticated user retrieve other tenants' robot accounts together with their decrypted authentication tokens. Because robot accounts are the identities that CI/CD systems use to pull and push images, Red Hat rates CVE-2026-110697 at CVSS 9.9 and notes that stolen credentials can be used to read, push, or overwrite a victim tenant's images.
Red Hat Quay is a private container registry for storing and distributing images across datacenter and cloud environments, including OpenShift and Kubernetes clusters. Red Hat says Quay launched in late 2013 as the first private hosted registry on the market. Today it ships as a self-managed product, is included with OpenShift Platform Plus, and runs as the hosted Quay.io service, all built from the upstream Project Quay codebase. That makes it a shared trust boundary for many organizations' software supply chains, which is exactly the boundary this bug crosses.
Technical information
Root cause
The flaw is classified as CWE 89 and sits in how Quay lists robot accounts for a namespace. Robot accounts are stored as User rows whose username follows the format <namespace>+<shortname>. To find all robots belonging to a namespace, _list_entity_robots in data/model/user.py performs a prefix match using Peewee's ** operator, which compiles to a SQL LIKE (or ILIKE). The current upstream code builds the pattern through plain string concatenation:
.where(User.robot == True, User.username ** (entity_name + "+%"))
In LIKE syntax, % matches any run of characters and _ matches exactly one character. Quay namespace names are allowed to contain _, and nothing on this path escapes it. If an attacker's namespace is ab_c, the generated pattern is ab_c+%. That pattern matches the attacker's own robots, but it also matches robots such as abxc+deploy that belong to an entirely different tenant.
The robot listing response includes tokens, so the matched robots come back to the attacker with their decrypted credentials. Bugzilla lists two further impacts: the attacker can take over a victim's robots by renaming the attacker's namespace, and can delete a victim's robots by deleting it.
Quay already contains a correct helper. As the Bugzilla entry points out, prefix_search in data/text.py escapes every LIKE metacharacter and adds an explicit escape clause, but the robot listing path never calls it:
def _escape_wildcard(search_query): search_query = ( search_query.replace("!", "!!").replace("%", "!%").replace("_", "!_").replace("[", "


