Introduction
A single oversized identity in an EAP SIM authentication exchange is enough to crash a FreeRADIUS server that has SIM-based authentication enabled. For operators who rely on RADIUS to gate network access, a crash of the authentication service means clients cannot authenticate until the daemon is restarted. The attacker needs no credentials to trigger it.
FreeRADIUS is an open-source RADIUS server that provides authentication, authorization, and accounting for network access. The project was founded in June 1999. It reports use across more than 50,000 sites, with deployments ranging from 10 users to more than 10 million users, and lists customers including Fortune 500 companies, Tier 1 ISPs, and academic networks such as eduroam. It also forms the basis for a number of commercial offerings, so flaws in its EAP handling matter well beyond direct users of the open-source package.
Red Hat rates CVE-2026-127029 as Important, with a preliminary CVSS 3.1 score of 7.5: network attack vector, low complexity, no privileges, no user interaction, and high availability impact with no confidentiality or integrity impact. The weakness is classified as CWE 787 (out-of-bounds write).
Technical information
Background: EAP SIM key derivation
EAP SIM (RFC 4186) derives its Master Key by hashing a concatenation of several values:
SHA1(Identity | n*Kc | NONCE_MT | Version List | Selected Version)
The peer supplies the Identity component. Its length is therefore attacker controlled, and the vulnerable code did not treat it that way.
Root cause: two fixed-size buffers
The old implementation had two places where a long identity could overflow storage.
1. The identity field in struct eapsim_keys. The structure held the identity in a fixed array, uint8_t identity[MAX_STRING_LEN]. In eap_sim_sendchallenge(), the server copied the outer EAP identity into that array using strlen(handler->identity) as the length, without checking it against the size of the array.
2. The 256-byte staging buffer in eapsim_calculate_keys(). Key derivation packed every input into a local stack buffer, unsigned char buf[256], through a chain of memcpy() calls. One of those copies used ek->identitylen directly. Even an identity that passed the old MAX_STRING_LEN check could not fit. Roughly 254 bytes of identity, plus three 8-byte Kc values, a 16-byte nonce, and the version fields, adds up to more than 256 bytes. The result is attacker-controlled data written past the end of a stack buffer.
The upstream developers summarized the problem in a comment added with the fix: the identity is supplied by the caller and "has no length limit," so any staging buffer would require bounds checks.
Attack flow
Based on the Red Hat description and the patch analysis, exploitation proceeds as follows:
- The attacker reaches a FreeRADIUS instance that has the EAP SIM submodule enabled. Red Hat describes the path as network reachable, unauthenticated, and requiring no user interaction.
- The attacker sends specially crafted EAP SIM authentication messages carrying an identity longer than the server's fixed storage can hold.
- While building the challenge in
eap_sim_sendchallenge(), the server copies the identity into the keys structure without a length check. - During
eapsim_calculate_keys(), the identity is packed with the other key derivation inputs into the 256-byte stack buffer, overflowing it. - The stack corruption crashes the RADIUS service, producing a denial of service.
Red Hat notes that CWE 787 as a class can corrupt memory, but the CVE description and severity assessment identify denial of service as the reported impact. The available sources do not establish remote code execution, so we treat this strictly as a crash and availability issue.
Patch information
The upstream fix is FreeRADIUS commit e415f818dcdf91626e5e7314b3a4f819ab11f572, titled "make EAP SIM independent of identity length". Alan T. DeKok committed and signed it on September 16, 2026. The commit message states the intent to "avoid overflow on long identities" and credits Glen Saunders with reporting the issue. It touches 4 files, with 39 insertions and 58 deletions.
Red Hat's advisory also lists commit 064567a08f3b. That commit only changes rlm_eap_fast.c and fixes a separate stack overflow in EAP FAST PAC handling, not this EAP SIM bug.
The fix does not add a better length check. It removes fixed-size storage from the identity path entirely.
Part 1: streaming the hash inputs (eapcrypto.c)
The buf[256] staging buffer, its memcpy chain, and a debug dump block were deleted. Each input now goes directly to SHA1:
fr_sha1_init(&context); fr_sha1_update(&context, ek->identity, ek->identitylen); fr_sha1_update(&context, ek->Kc[0], EAPSIM_KC_SIZE); fr_sha1_update(&context, ek->Kc[1], EAPSIM_KC_SIZE); fr_sha1_update(&context, ek->Kc[2], EAPSIM_KC_SIZE); fr_sha1_update(&context, ek->nonce_mt, sizeof(ek->nonce_mt)); fr_sha1_update(&context, ek->versionlist, ek->versionlistlen); fr_sha1_update(&context, ek->versionselect, sizeof(ek->versionselect)); fr_sha1_final(ek->master_key, &context);
Because SHA1 is a streaming hash, piecewise updates produce exactly the same digest as hashing the concatenated buffer. Key derivation output is unchanged. The test vectors in the same file were only adjusted for the new structure layout.
Part 2: heap-allocated identity (eap_sim.h, rlm_eap_sim.c)
The structure field changes from the fixed array uint8_t identity[MAX_STRING_LEN] to a pointer, uint8_t *identity.
In eap_sim_sendchallenge(), any previous identity is released with TALLOC_FREE(). If the packet carries an AT_IDENTITY attribute, the server checks only that the length in the attribute's 2-byte prefix fits inside the received attribute, then copies exactly that many bytes with talloc_memdup(handler, ...). The old MAX_STRING_LEN cap is gone because the destination is always allocated at the correct size.
The order of operations also changed. The old code always copied the EAP identity first and then overwrote it. The new code tries AT_IDENTITY first and only falls back to a heap copy of the EAP identity when that attribute is missing or malformed:
if (!ess->keys.identity) { ess->keys.identitylen = strlen(handler->identity); MEM(ess->keys.identity = talloc_memdup(handler, handler->identity, ess->keys.identitylen)); }
Test client change (radeapclient.c)
The bundled test client used the same pattern, a memcpy into the fixed keys.identity array. It now takes the length from vp->vp_length instead of strlen() and stores a talloc_memdup() copy in a new identity field of its context. A comment explains that the copy is required because the keys are used in a later round trip, after the original packet has been freed.
The touched files (src/modules/rlm_eap/libeap/... and rlm_eap_sim.c) belong to the older rlm_eap source layout.
Release status: none of the reviewed sources name a FreeRADIUS release that includes this commit. Red Hat's Bugzilla entry shows status NEW with an empty "Fixed In Version" field.
Affected systems and versions
The reviewed sources do not provide an exact vulnerable version range or a minimum fixed release for this CVE. What is established:
- Vulnerable configuration: FreeRADIUS deployments with the EAP SIM submodule explicitly enabled (the
simblock in the EAP module configuration). Red Hat states that deployments not processing SIM-based mobile authentication are not affected. - Code layout: the vulnerable functions live in the older
rlm_eapsource layout (src/modules/rlm_eap/libeap/andrlm_eap_sim.c). - Red Hat Enterprise Linux: every supported RHEL stream (7, 8, 9, and 10) is listed as Affected, with no errata published at the time of review.
The FreeRADIUS 3.0.28 and 3.2.9 releases referenced in the project's June 2026 security notice address separate issues and should not be treated as fixed versions for CVE-2026-127029.
Interim mitigation
Until a fixed build is available, Red Hat recommends the following:
- If EAP SIM is not required, edit
/etc/raddb/mods-available/eapor/etc/raddb/mods-enabled/eapand comment out or remove thesimblock. - Restart the service:
systemctl restart radiusd
A restart or reload temporarily interrupts active authentication requests, and any clients relying on EAP SIM will stop authenticating once the module is disabled.
- Restrict UDP ports 1812 and 1813 to trusted Network Access Server IP addresses. The FreeRADIUS project separately recommends keeping RADIUS servers on a management VLAN, never exposing them to the Internet, and disabling unused features.
Vendor security history
FreeRADIUS maintains a public security notifications page. Its June 2026 disclosure covered multiple issues in older 3.0 and 3.2 releases, including crash-inducing buffer overflows in several EAP methods, and recommended upgrading to 3.0.28 or 3.2.9 for those issues. A separate EAP FAST stack overflow fix (commit 064567a08f3b) appeared alongside this EAP SIM fix, which suggests EAP method parsers remain an active area of hardening. The project states that its builds use compiler warning checks, static analyzers, fuzzers, and tests.
On the disclosure side, Red Hat credits s4cr00t of the Alipay Security Team for reporting CVE-2026-127029 and names Glen Saunders as the original reporter. The reviewed sources do not confirm exploitation in the wild, and no public exploit code was identified. Exploitation status should be considered unknown.
References
- NVD: CVE-2026-127029
- CVE.org: CVE-2026-127029
- Red Hat Customer Portal: CVE-2026-127029
- Red Hat Bugzilla 2572339
- FreeRADIUS commit e415f81: make EAP SIM independent of identity length
- GitHub API: commit e415f81
- FreeRADIUS commit 064567a: Fix possible stack overflow in EAP FAST (separate issue)
- GitHub API: commit 064567a
- FreeRADIUS: About Us
- FreeRADIUS Documentation: What is FreeRADIUS?
- FreeRADIUS Security Notifications



