Automated Threat Modeling

Brief Summary: FortiOS and FortiPAM CVE-2026-126255 SSH Authentication Bypass via Path Traversal

A brief summary of CVE-2026-126255, a CVSS 7.4 path traversal flaw in the Fortinet sshd that can let an unauthenticated attacker bypass SSH authentication when GPC OS Login is enabled. Includes vendor patch and migration information for FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiSASE and FortiProxy.

CVE Analysis

8 min read

Gaurav Sarraf
Gaurav Sarraf

2026-11-11

Brief Summary: FortiOS and FortiPAM CVE-2026-126255 SSH Authentication Bypass via Path Traversal

Introduction

Fortinet has fixed a flaw in the SSH daemon shared by FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiSASE and FortiProxy that can let an unauthenticated attacker skip SSH authentication by submitting specially crafted credentials, as long as the device has GPC OS Login enabled. Because FortiOS runs underneath the Fortinet firewall line, which the company claims secures 55% of deployed firewalls worldwide, a login bypass in sshd is worth a careful read even with its configuration prerequisite.

The issue is tracked as CVE-2026-126255 and carries a Fortinet-supplied CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.4 (High). Fortinet marks it as not known to be exploited, and it was found internally rather than reported from outside. In this short review we walk through what the advisory and the CVE record say, where the metadata disagrees with itself, and which remediation path applies to each product.

Technical information

Root cause

NVD classifies the weakness as CWE-24, Path Traversal: '../filedir'. Fortinet's advisory, FG-IR-26-269, is titled "Improper neutralization of special elements in output used by a downstream component in sshd" and labels the affected component CLI. Taken together, the advisory and CVE record describe this chain:

  • A credential value supplied during SSH login contains path traversal sequences.
  • sshd does not neutralize those sequences before passing the value on.
  • The value reaches a downstream component inside sshd, and the result is that authentication is bypassed.

Fortinet limits impact to devices where GPC OS Login is enabled (the spelling follows the advisory). That points to the external identity login path in sshd as the code that was hardened, rather than ordinary local password authentication.

Much of the detail is not published. FortiOS is closed source, there is no public diff, and neither the advisory nor NVD discloses the credential format, the traversal destination, the vulnerable function, the account identity an attacker ends up with, or the privileges obtained after the bypass. The string ../filedir is the name of the CWE category, not a working payload. The material is enough to identify the attack surface and prerequisite, but not to reconstruct an exploit.

Attack flow

Based only on what the advisory and NVD describe, an attack would proceed as follows:

  1. The attacker reaches the SSH service of an affected FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiSASE or FortiProxy instance over the network. Under CVSS, a network vector can also mean access restricted to an intranet, so this does not by itself imply internet exposure.
  2. The target must have GPC OS Login enabled. Otherwise, Fortinet says, the product is not impacted.
  3. The attacker, holding no prior credentials, submits specially crafted credentials containing traversal sequences.
  4. Those sequences reach the downstream component in sshd without being neutralized.
  5. sshd treats the login as authenticated. The resulting account and privilege level are not documented.

CVSS scoring

NVD displays the Fortinet CNA base vector rather than an independent NIST score:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
  • AV:N: network attack vector.
  • AC:H: high attack complexity. Success depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control, which aligns with the GPC OS Login prerequisite.
  • PR:N / UI:N: no prior privileges and no user interaction.
  • S:U: unchanged scope.
  • C:H / I:H: high confidentiality and integrity impact in the scoring model.
  • A:N: no availability impact.

Fortinet also publishes a temporal score of 7.0 with E:P and RL:O. FIRST defines E:P as Proof of Concept maturity: code or a demonstration exists that is not practical for most systems and may need substantial modification. RL:O means an official fix is available. The advisory provides no public exploit URL or attack demonstration, so the E:P rating should not be read as weaponization.

Conflicting metadata

The advisory is not internally consistent, and we think it is worth preserving that rather than smoothing it over:

  • The title describes improper neutralization of output used by a downstream component, while the summary and CWE describe path traversal.
  • The summary describes authentication bypass, the advisory Impact field says Denial of service, and the vector sets A:N.
  • The H ISAC bulletin covering this batch of Fortinet issues is titled around arbitrary code execution, but nothing in the sources establishes code execution for this specific CVE.

For exposure assessment, the explicit authentication bypass description plus the GPC OS Login prerequisite are the most useful facts. We would not escalate this to confirmed code execution or assume a particular post-exploitation privilege level.

Disclosure and exploitation status

Fortinet published the advisory on November 10, 2026, and NVD lists publication on November 11, 2026. Fortinet credits Loic Pantano of its Product Security team, who found the issue internally using the AI model Claude Mythos, and the fix shipped as a coordinated release.

Fortinet marks the issue as Known Exploited: No. The November 11, 2026 H ISAC bulletin reports no active exploitation of the covered batch. No threat actor attribution, indicators of compromise or CVE-specific detection signatures are published, and CISA KEV inclusion is not established in the available sources.

Patch information

Fix type: vendor firmware update, closed source, no public diff. Everything known about the fix comes from advisory FG-IR-26-269 and the CVE record.

Where the fix lives. The advisory title places the fix in the SSH daemon of FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiSASE and FortiProxy, and the GPC OS Login condition points to the external identity login path. Fortinet has not published the internal change. For this class of bug, the fix normally means either cleaning up or rejecting credential-derived input (for example, ../ or path separators in usernames) before it is used to build a path or lookup key, or pinning the resolved path to a fixed base directory.

Fixed FortiOS releases:

  • FortiOS 8.0: vulnerable 8.0.0 through 8.0.1, fixed in 8.0.2 or above
  • FortiOS 7.6: vulnerable 7.6.0 through 7.6.7, fixed in 7.6.8 or above
  • FortiOS 7.4: vulnerable 7.4.0 through 7.4.12, fixed in 7.4.13 or above
  • FortiOS 7.2: vulnerable 7.2.0 through 7.2.13, fixed in 7.2.14 or above

FortiPAM. Branches 1.0 through 1.6 get no in-branch fix. The advisory's only instruction is to migrate to a fixed release. The solutions field in the CVE record gives target versions of FortiPAM 1.9.3 or above, plus upcoming 1.8.5, 1.7.3 and 7.0.1. Moving off 1.0 through 1.6 therefore means jumping to a newer line, not installing a maintenance patch.

FortiSASE. Fortinet fixed the service on its side in 26.3.2, so customers on 26.3.1 or 26.3.1_a need to do nothing. Older affected lines (25.1 through 26.2) are told to migrate to a fixed release.

FortiProxy. The advisory summary names FortiProxy, but its version table has no FortiProxy rows and no fixed build, and the NVD and CVE records list only FortiOS and FortiPAM. Ask Fortinet support which FortiProxy builds carry the fix.

Planning notes:

  • Fortinet states Virtual Patch: No, so there is no IPS signature, and a firmware upgrade is the only fix the vendor has published.
  • No CVE-specific workaround is published. GPC OS Login is an exposure prerequisite, but Fortinet does not document disabling it as a supported workaround.
  • The RL:O element in the CVSS vector confirms an official fix exists.
  • Fortinet recommends planning the jump with its upgrade path tool, especially when crossing several minor versions.
  • Discrepancy: the CVE record lists target versions for FortiPAM 1.7 through 7.0, while the advisory table marks those same branches as not affected. Most likely those are the versions to migrate to from 1.0 through 1.6, not lines that need their own fix. Treat the advisory table as the authority on what is affected.

Affected systems and versions

All affected products are exposed only when GPC OS Login is enabled.

FortiOS

  • 8.0.0 through 8.0.1
  • 7.6.0 through 7.6.7
  • 7.4.0 through 7.4.12
  • 7.2.0 through 7.2.13

The H ISAC bulletin describes all FortiOS 7.4 and 7.2 versions as affected. We follow the narrower upper bounds in the vendor advisory, listed above.

FortiPAM

  • All versions of 1.6, 1.5, 1.4, 1.3, 1.2, 1.1 and 1.0
  • Not affected: 7.0, 1.9, 1.8 and 1.7

FortiSASE

  • 26.3.1 and 26.3.1_a (remediated by Fortinet in 26.3.2, no customer action)
  • All versions of 26.2, 26.1, 25.4, 25.3, 25.2, 25.1.a and 25.1 (migrate to a fixed release)
  • Not affected: 24.4, 24.3, 24.1, 23.4, 23.3, 23.2, 23.1 and 22.4

FortiProxy

  • Named in the advisory summary, but no affected or fixed version range is published.

The not-affected lists cover only the explicitly named branches. They are not a blanket assurance for unlisted releases.

Vendor security history

Fortinet has a documented history of exploited vulnerabilities in FortiGate products. In April 2025, CISA highlighted that attackers had previously exploited CVE-2024-21762, CVE-2023-27997 and CVE-2022-42475. Fortinet's analysis described an actor creating a symbolic link in the area that serves SSL VPN language files, linking the user filesystem to the root filesystem. That link could survive an upgrade that fixed the original vulnerabilities, preserving read access to files that could include configurations. Fortinet responded with detection and removal measures, changes to stop the malicious links from being served, and direct customer communications, and CISA published remediation guidance.

The lesson from that incident is that closing an entry vulnerability and removing an existing compromise can be separate tasks. It does not establish persistence, exploitation or a similar recovery requirement for CVE-2026-126255, which has a different mechanism and no reported exploitation.

Fortinet's PSIRT policy describes coordinated disclosure, severity-based remediation and routine advisories on the second Tuesday of each month, with out-of-cycle advisories possible when active exploitation increases customer risk.

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