Automated Threat Modeling

Quick Look: Arista EOS CVE-2026-121367, Silent RIPv2 on Management Interfaces Enables Unauthenticated Route Injection

A brief summary of CVE-2026-121367, an Arista EOS flaw where RIPv2 can be silently active on management interfaces and accept unauthenticated route advertisements. Covers affected releases, fixed EOS builds, and detection approaches based on configuration audits and routing-table baselines.

CVE Analysis

9 min read

Gaurav Sarraf
Gaurav Sarraf

2026-11-11

Quick Look: Arista EOS CVE-2026-121367, Silent RIPv2 on Management Interfaces Enables Unauthenticated Route Injection

Introduction

A logic flaw in Arista EOS can leave RIPv2 running on a switch's management interface even when the RIP agent intends to keep it off. That opens an unauthenticated path for injecting routes into the device. The switch's routing table steers traffic for every system behind it, so forged advertisements accepted this way could redirect flows to an attacker-controlled destination or blackhole legitimate traffic with more specific prefixes.

The CVE feed lists the vendor as unknown, but the CNA record and Arista Security Advisory 0220 identify the affected product as Arista Networks EOS. Arista discovered the issue internally and states it is not aware of malicious exploitation in customer networks. This review draws on the vendor advisory and related public sources.

Technical information

Root cause

Arista classifies CVE-2026-121367 as CWE-440, Expected Behavior Violation, and tracks it internally as BUG 1981966. The RIP code was correct in intent and wrong in practice. The RIP agent means to keep RIPv2 off the management interface, but on affected builds the management interface is still processed whenever a RIP network statement covers the management subnet in the same VRF.

Visibility is what makes this awkward for operators. Arista warns that RIP processing on the management interface may not appear in the running configuration. A routine config review that finds no RIP statement on the management interface therefore does not prove the interface is excluded. The defect is precisely a violation of that intended exclusion.

Arista does not publish an exploit packet format or an implementation-level root cause. EOS is closed source, so there is no public diff to examine.

Exposure conditions

A device is exposed only when all of the following hold:

  1. It runs an affected EOS release (see the version list below).
  2. RIP is enabled.
  3. A RIP network statement matches the management interface subnet in the same VRF.

The advisory illustrates the risky configuration with this example, where the RIP network 10.252.36.128/25 covers the address on Management1:

switch# show running-config section router rip router rip network 10.252.36.128/25 no shutdown switch# show running-config section interface Management1 interface Management1 ip address 10.252.36.194/25

These addresses are Arista's illustrative example, not indicators of an attack.

Attack flow

Based on the advisory, exploitation proceeds as follows:

  1. The target runs an affected EOS release with RIP enabled and a network statement covering the management subnet in the same VRF.
  2. An unauthenticated attacker with access to the adjacent network sends crafted RIPv2 route advertisements to the device's management IP address.
  3. Because RIPv2 is silently active on the management interface, the device could accept and install those routes without authentication.
  4. The installed routes can redirect traffic to an attacker-controlled destination, blackhole legitimate traffic through more specific prefixes, or otherwise disrupt reachability for systems whose traffic transits the device.

This is a routing-manipulation issue. The advisory describes traffic and reachability consequences, not arbitrary code execution or acquisition of an administrative account.

Scoring

Arista publishes two assessments:

  • CVSS v3.1: 9.6 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:H
  • CVSS v4.0: 6.1 Medium, CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:L/SA:L

NVD displays the CNA-supplied v4.0 score and does not provide an independent NIST assessment, so the lower number is not a NIST downgrade. Both vectors describe adjacent network access, low attack complexity, no privileges, and no user interaction. The v4.0 vector also marks attack requirements as present (AT:P). The totals differ because the scoring models differ, and neither changes the documented potential for traffic redirection and loss of reachability.

Exploitation status

Arista reports internal discovery and no known malicious exploitation in customer networks. That statement reflects Arista's awareness and does not prove that exploitation has never occurred. The reviewed material names no threat actor or campaign. A Threat Radar entry dated November 10, 2026 reports no exploitation evidence on record, no CISA KEV listing, and no public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit DB. Treat those as secondary observations rather than an exhaustive inventory.

Patch information

Arista fixed CVE-2026-121367 by shipping new EOS releases. The advisory states plainly that no standalone hotfix is available. The fixed releases make the data plane do what the RIP agent already intended: management interfaces are no longer silently added to RIPv2 processing, so RIPv2 advertisements sent to the management IP are not accepted or installed.

Fixed releases

  • 4.36.x: 4.36.2F and earlier vulnerable, fixed in 4.36.3M and later
  • 4.35.x: 4.35.6M and earlier vulnerable, fixed in 4.35.7M and later
  • 4.34.x: 4.34.8M and earlier vulnerable, fixed in 4.34.9M and later
  • 4.33.x: 4.33.10M and earlier vulnerable, fixed in 4.33.11M and later
  • 4.37.x: 4.37.0F listed as affected, with no fixed 4.37 build listed yet
  • 4.32.x and End of Support trains: all releases affected and no fix, so move to a supported fixed train

The fix works the same way on every EOS-based product in the affected list, including hardware switch families, CloudEOS, cEOS lab, vEOS lab, and CloudVision eXchange. Upgrade EOS to a fixed build.

Gaps to watch

  • 4.37.0F: Listed as affected, but the Resolution section names no fixed 4.37 release. Either move back to a fixed build on a maintenance (M) train or wait for a 4.37 release that Arista confirms contains the fix. Do not assume an unlisted fix.
  • 4.32.x and End of Support trains: No backport. The only remediation is moving to a supported train at or above the fixed version.
  • Choosing a build: Arista recommends the newest release in your train rather than the first fixed one, because later builds carry all listed fixes. Upgrade procedures are in the EOS User Manual chapter on upgrades and downgrades, linked from the advisory.
  • Advisory status: Revision 1.0 of Advisory 0220 (November 10, 2026) is labelled as an initial release, draft for review. Check the advisory, or its CSAF JSON, for later revisions that may add a 4.37 fix or change the version list.

Configuration mitigation before upgrading

Where RIP is not required, Arista recommends disabling it within each affected VRF. The advisory documents this sequence for the default VRF:

switch# configure terminal switch(config)# router rip switch(config-router-rip)# shutdown switch(config-router-rip)# end

If RIP is required on data interfaces but not on the management subnet, verify that no RIP network prefix matches that management subnet. Arista warns that disabling RIP or changing network statements may withdraw routes and interrupt connectivity, so plan a change window, confirm alternate routing, and verify the resulting configuration and route behavior.

Verifying the fix

The fix adds no new command or configuration knob. Confirm remediation by checking that show version reports a release at or above the fixed version for the device's train. Existing router rip network statements do not need to change after upgrading.

Detection methods

Arista states there are no direct indicators of compromise. We found no public Snort, Suricata, Sigma, or YARA rule for this CVE, and Rapid7's entry describes the vulnerability without a detection check. Detection therefore comes down to two tasks: identifying exposed devices and spotting the routing changes an attack would cause.

1. Audit exposure without trusting the running config alone

Management-interface RIP processing may not appear in the running configuration, so look for the conditions that produce it instead: RIP enabled, and a RIP network statement matching the management interface subnet in the same VRF. Compare the two configuration sections shown in the advisory example above.

This is easy to automate. Have a config audit tool or NetDevOps pipeline pull the router rip and Management1 sections from every EOS device and flag any device where a RIP network prefix contains the management interface address in the same VRF. Then cross-reference flagged devices against the affected EOS versions to prioritize.

2. Watch the routing table

The only evidence an attack leaves is in the routing table. Arista lists these warning signs of unauthorized RIP advertisements:

  • RIP-learned routes you did not expect
  • Next hops not on your approved list, especially management segment addresses that do not belong to a known RIP peer
  • More specific routes overriding legitimate aggregates, which can redirect or blackhole traffic
  • Route changes that redirect traffic or break reachability

Arista recommends comparing the current table against your approved routing design and known peer inventory using:

switch# show ip route

This works best as a baseline-and-diff process. Save a known-good snapshot of RIP-learned routes per device, collect the table on a schedule or through streaming telemetry, and alert on any new RIP route or next hop. Raise severity when the next hop or advertising source sits on the management subnet, since no legitimate peer should send routing updates there. An unexpected route is an investigative lead, not proof that this CVE was exploited.

3. Network-level hunting

Arista has not published a network signature. RIPv2 runs over UDP port 520, so if you capture packets or collect flow data on the management network, RIP traffic aimed at a switch management IP is a strong lead, because management segments normally carry no routing protocol traffic. This is a hunting idea based on protocol behavior, not a vendor-validated rule. Confirm any hit with the routing table checks above.

Affected systems and versions

Affected EOS releases

  • 4.37.x: 4.37.0F (no fixed 4.37 release specified)
  • 4.36.x: 4.36.2F and below within the train
  • 4.35.x: 4.35.6M and below within the train
  • 4.34.x: 4.34.8M and below within the train
  • 4.33.x: 4.33.10M and below within the train
  • 4.32.x: all releases
  • End of Support trains: all releases

Vulnerable configuration

An affected release alone is not enough. Exposure requires RIP to be enabled and a RIP network statement to match the management interface subnet in the same VRF.

Affected product families

Arista lists these EOS product families as affected: 710, 720D, 720XP/722XPM, 750X, 7010TX, 7020R/R4, 7130 running EOS, 7170, 7050X3/X4, 7060X/X2/X4/X5/X6/XE7, 7260X/X3, 7280R/R2/R3/R4, 7300X/X3, 7320X, 7358X4, 7368X4, 7388X5, 7500R/R2/R3, 7800R3/R4, 7700R4, AWE 5000, AWE 7200R, and ZTX 7200. The list also includes CloudEOS, cEOS lab, vEOS lab, and CloudVision eXchange, whether virtual or physical.

Products listed as unaffected

Arista lists these products as unaffected:

  • WiFi access points
  • CloudVision CUE cloud delivery
  • CloudVision Portal, including CV CUE on premises
  • CloudVision Appliance Software
  • CloudVision as a Service
  • CloudVision AGNI cloud and appliance delivery
  • Converged Cloud Fabric
  • The listed DANZ Monitoring Fabric appliances
  • Multi Cloud Director
  • NDR Security Platform
  • Edge Threat Management
  • NetVisor OS, NetVisor UNUM, and Insight Analytics
  • VeloCloud Orchestrator, Gateway, and Edge

CloudVision eXchange is affected and should not be confused with the unaffected CloudVision offerings.

Vendor security history

In its annual filing, Arista describes EOS as the software foundation providing switching, routing, state streaming, and telemetry across its platforms, including hardware, vEOS, and CloudEOS. That shared codebase explains why Advisory 0220 spans both physical switches and virtual EOS products. Fierce Network reported on July 22, 2026 that Arista is the leading data center switch vendor and overtook Cisco as the largest data center Ethernet switch vendor in 2024. That position is specific to data center switching.

Arista runs a PSIRT that monitors vulnerability reports and coordinates with researchers. The PSIRT is reachable at [email protected], and [email protected] handles help with workarounds and hotfix installation. Network World reported on September 2, 2026 that Arista attributed an elevated volume of advisories to changes in vulnerability detection involving AI tools. That is Arista's reported explanation, not independent evidence that its products became more or less secure.

Security Advisory 0137, CVE-2026-7473, makes a useful contrast. There, affected EOS tunnel endpoints incorrectly decapsulated and forwarded unexpected tunneled packets. Arista states that issue was reported exploited in the wild and credits researchers at Comcast. For that vulnerability, Arista planned no software upgrade path because of the risk of breaking existing configurations, and relied instead on documented mitigation with no hotfix. Advisory 0220 lists fixed releases. The two cases are unrelated, and the exploitation status of CVE-2026-7473 says nothing about CVE-2026-121367. The comparison shows why each advisory's resolution section has to be read on its own terms.

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