Automated Threat Modeling

Overview of CVE-2026-120722: Stack-Based Buffer Overflow in the F5 BIG-IP DNS::scrape iRule Command

A brief summary of CVE-2026-120722, a critical stack-based buffer overflow in the F5 BIG-IP DNS::scrape iRule command that can crash TMM and may allow remote code execution. Covers affected versions, F5 engineering hotfixes, and exposure detection approaches.

CVE Analysis

8 min read

Gaurav Sarraf
Gaurav Sarraf

2026-11-18

Overview of CVE-2026-120722: Stack-Based Buffer Overflow in the F5 BIG-IP DNS::scrape iRule Command

Introduction

F5 has shipped engineering hotfixes for a stack-based buffer overflow in the DNS::scrape iRule command that lets a remote, unauthenticated attacker terminate the Traffic Management Microkernel (TMM) on BIG-IP DNS and BIG-IP Next for Kubernetes, and possibly execute code. Because TMM carries data-plane traffic, traffic is disrupted while the process restarts, and F5 lists no mitigation other than installing the fixed builds.

F5 scores the issue at CVSS 3.1 9.8 and CVSS 4.0 9.3, both Critical, and published its advisory (K000163945) on November 18, 2026 alongside an out-of-band security notification. Exposure is configuration dependent, which makes inventory work just as important as patching.

Technical information

Root cause

The vulnerable code is the iRule command DNS::scrape, which iRules use to parse DNS messages from client traffic on a virtual server. F5 classifies the bug as CWE-121: Stack-Based Buffer Overflow and tracks it internally as ID 2535409 for both BIG-IP DNS and BIG-IP Next for Kubernetes.

That bug class explains the two impacts F5 lists:

  • Corrupting the stack of TMM can crash it, causing denial of service while TMM restarts.
  • A controlled overwrite could lead to remote code execution.

F5 describes this as a data-plane issue only, with no control-plane exposure. Attackers reach it through virtual servers that process client traffic, not through the management interface.

F5 found the flaw internally and has not described the triggering input beyond "undisclosed requests". It also has not said how the code was changed. For this kind of bug, the usual fix is to check DNS field lengths before copying data into fixed-size stack buffers inside DNS::scrape, but F5 has not confirmed that this is what it did. No vulnerable code, request contents, or proof-of-concept material is publicly available.

Preconditions

All of the following must be true for a device to be exposed:

  • The device runs an affected product and version (see Affected systems and versions).
  • An iRule that processes client traffic using DNS::scrape exists.
  • That iRule is attached to a virtual server that receives client traffic.

A device on an affected build with no such iRule attached is not exposed to this path.

Attack flow

Based on the advisory, the attack proceeds as follows:

  1. The attacker reaches a virtual server that has an iRule using DNS::scrape on client traffic. No authentication is required.
  2. The attacker sends specially formed requests (F5 has not disclosed the specific contents) to that virtual server.
  3. The iRule invokes DNS::scrape on the attacker-supplied DNS data, and the parser overflows a stack buffer inside TMM.
  4. In the denial-of-service case, TMM terminates and traffic is disrupted while it restarts.
  5. F5 further warns that the attacker may be able to achieve remote code execution, consistent with a controlled stack overwrite.

Patch information

F5 fixed this issue with engineering hotfixes (EHFs). These are closed-source builds downloaded from MyF5, so there is no public commit or diff to review. The CNA record tags the advisory as both vendor-advisory and patch.

Fixed builds

  • BIG-IP DNS 21.x (vulnerable: 21.1.0): BIGIP-21.1.0.4.0.19.3-ENG
  • BIG-IP DNS 17.5.x (vulnerable: 17.5.0 through 17.5.1): BIGIP-17.5.1.11.0.61.12-ENG, BIGIP-17.5.1.10.0.80.35-ENG
  • BIG-IP DNS 17.1.x (vulnerable: 17.1.0 through 17.1.3): BIGIP-17.1.3.7.0.21.4-ENG, BIGIP-17.1.3.6.0.14.20-ENG
  • BIG-IP Next for Kubernetes 2.4.x (vulnerable: 2.4.0 through 2.4.2): BNK-2.4.2-EHF1
  • BIG-IP Next for Kubernetes 2.3.x (vulnerable: 2.3.0 through 2.3.4): BNK-2.3.4-EHF1
  • BIG-IP Next for Kubernetes 2.2.x (vulnerable: 2.2.0 through 2.2.5): BNK-2.2.5-EHF1

On the F5 advisory page, the BNK build names appear with a trailing "3", for example EHF13. That is a footnote marker. The CVE record lists the builds as BNK-x.y.z-EHF1.

Choosing the right TMOS hotfix

The 17.x branches each have two fixed builds, and the one you need depends on what you run now. F5 article K000164239 explains this for the EHFs released with the November 18, 2026 out-of-band notification:

  • 17.1.x: Use BIGIP-17.1.3.6.0.14.20-ENG if you are on BIGIP-17.1.3.6.0.9.20-ENG. Use BIGIP-17.1.3.7.0.21.4-ENG if you are on base release 17.1.3.7 or earlier.
  • 17.5.x: Use BIGIP-17.5.1.10.0.80.35-ENG if you are on BIGIP-17.5.1.10.0.7.35-ENG or BIG-IP-17.5.1.10.0.37.35-ENG. Use BIGIP-17.5.1.11.0.61.12-ENG if you are on base release 17.5.1.11 or earlier.
  • 21.1.x: Use BIGIP-21.1.0.4.0.19.3-ENG if you are on base release 21.1.0.4 or earlier.
  • Custom engineering hotfix: Contact F5 Support for a rebuilt EHF. Installing one of the standard builds would likely remove the fixes in your custom build.

Caveats

  • EHFs are not scheduled releases. F5 says they do not get the full QA of scheduled releases and come with no warranty or guarantee of usability. Expect the fix to be included later in regular maintenance releases. Under F5's versioning policy, once a branch has a fix, later releases on that branch include it.
  • There is no workaround. Both the advisory and the CVE record list mitigation as "None", so installing the hotfix is the only fix F5 provides.
  • The sources disagree on product scope. F5's advisory marks BIG-IP CNF as not vulnerable, but the CNA JSON record also lists "BIG-IP Next CNF" 2.2.0 through 2.4.x as affected and points to the same BNK-*-EHF1 builds. If you run CNF, check with F5 which applies to you.

Detection methods

Public guidance for this CVE covers exposure detection, meaning whether a BIG-IP system is susceptible. It does not cover detecting exploitation. Since F5 only describes the trigger as "undisclosed requests", there is no published request pattern, packet signature, IoC set, or Snort, Suricata, YARA, or Sigma rule tied to this CVE.

1. Version-based exposure check. Compare each device's product and version with the affected version tables in K000163945. Only BIG-IP DNS and BIG-IP Next for Kubernetes are listed as vulnerable. The internal ID 2535409 is useful when matching hotfix notes or support cases.

2. Configuration-based exposure check. Inventory iRules that contain DNS::scrape and map them to the virtual servers using them. Because the issue is data plane only, focus on virtual servers that receive client traffic, especially internet-facing DNS listeners.

3. F5 iHealth diagnostics (K27404821). F5's advisory points to iHealth for diagnosing this vulnerability:

  • Generate a QKView on the BIG-IP. This is a compressed TAR of machine-readable XML diagnostic data.
  • Upload it to iHealth, open the device by hostname, and go to Diagnostics. iHealth checks logs, command output, and configuration against F5's vulnerability database and lists issues the device may be susceptible to.
  • For object-level detail, use Config Explorer, then LTM, pick the object type (iRules or virtual servers), filter to the object, and open its Diagnostics tab to confirm whether a specific iRule or virtual server is flagged.

F5 says the procedure has no impact on the running system. iHealth reports susceptibility, not compromise.

4. Commercial vulnerability scanning. Tenable's Plugins Pipeline lists a check named "f5_networks K000163945: BIG-IP iRule vulnerability CVE-2026-120722" (Issue ID 237822-5). As of 11/18/2026 its status is Development, so it has not shipped. Until it does, use the manual version and iRule inventory steps above.

5. Behavioural monitoring. The most practical sign of attempted exploitation is the impact F5 describes: TMM terminates and traffic is disrupted while it restarts. Treat unexpected TMM restarts or crashes on a device running an iRule with DNS::scrape, particularly when they coincide with DNS traffic spikes, as possible exploitation. Preserve logs, core files, and a QKView, and escalate. Because the bug is a stack overflow with possible remote code execution, a crash could reflect a failed or partial code execution attempt rather than a routine stability problem.

Affected systems and versions

Vulnerable products and versions listed by F5:

  • BIG-IP DNS: 21.1.0; 17.5.0 through 17.5.1; 17.1.0 through 17.1.3
  • BIG-IP Next for Kubernetes: 2.4.0 through 2.4.2; 2.3.0 through 2.3.4; 2.2.0 through 2.2.5
  • BIG-IP Next CNF: listed as affected (2.2.0 through 2.4.x) in the CNA JSON record only. F5's advisory marks BIG-IP CNF as not vulnerable.

Vulnerable configuration: an iRule that processes client traffic using DNS::scrape, attached to a virtual server.

Listed as not vulnerable: other BIG-IP modules, BIG-IQ Centralized Management, F5 Insight, F5OS (including F5OS-A and F5OS-C), NGINX products, F5 Distributed Cloud, and F5 AI Gateway.

F5 did not evaluate software versions that have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS), so the version matrix should not be read as an assessment of EoTS software.

Vendor security history

F5 maintains a formal vulnerability response policy (K4602). It accepts vulnerability reports, prioritizes investigations based on potential exploitability, uses CVSS 3.1 to communicate impact, assigns CVE identifiers, and publishes advisories with applicability, impact, and mitigation information. For critical issues, it releases hotfixes for supported versions that have not reached End of Software Development when technically feasible, which matches the EHF approach taken here.

Separately, F5 reported that in 2025 a nation-state-affiliated actor had persistent access to certain F5 systems and exfiltrated files, including some BIG-IP source code and information about undisclosed vulnerabilities. F5 said it had no evidence of software supply chain modification and no evidence that the actor accessed or modified NGINX source code or product development, F5 Distributed Cloud Services, or Silverline systems. None of the sources we reviewed connect that incident to CVE-2026-120722, and the available materials do not report exploitation of this CVE or attribute it to any group.

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