Brief Summary: Azure Managed Grafana CVE-2026-114160 SSRF Service Token Disclosure Leading to Elevation of Privilege

Introduction

A critical flaw in Microsoft's Azure Managed Grafana allowed an unauthenticated attacker to make the service send its own service access token to a server the attacker controls. Grafana workspaces in Azure are typically connected to monitoring data through Microsoft Entra identities and managed identities. A leaked service token therefore translates directly into whatever access that token carries, with no user interaction required.

Microsoft published the advisory on November 10, 2026. It rated the flaw CVSS 3.1 base 9.8 (temporal 8.5) and classified the impact as elevation of privilege, rooted in CWE 918, Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF). The fix was deployed inside the managed service, but Microsoft's own records set a customer action flag, which makes this more than a case of waiting for the cloud provider to patch itself.

Two fields in the raw CVE record are artifacts. The feed lists the vendor as "Unknown", and the description contains the placeholder text "No cwe for this issue". The affected vendor is Microsoft, and Microsoft and NVD explicitly classify the weakness as CWE 918.

Technical information

Root cause

Microsoft's FAQ describes the root cause in one sentence: an unauthenticated attacker could cause the affected service to make a request to a system the attacker controls, and that request disclosed a service access token. So the service attached its own credentials to an outbound request whose destination the attacker could choose.

This matches MITRE's definition of SSRF: a server retrieves a URL or similar request without sufficiently ensuring that the request is being sent to the expected destination. The severity in this instance comes from the bearer credential riding along with the request. Once the token reaches attacker infrastructure, the attacker can replay it and act with its permissions.

Severity vector

Microsoft and NVD publish the following base vector:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Microsoft also publishes the temporal vector:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C

The fields that matter most for defenders:

• AV:N / AC:L / PR:N / UI:N: reachable over the network, low complexity, no privileges, no user interaction.
• S:U: scope unchanged, with high confidentiality, integrity and availability impact.
• E:U: exploit code maturity Unproven.
• RL:O: an Official Fix exists, which is why the temporal score drops from 9.8 to 8.5.
• RC:C: report confidence Confirmed.

Attack flow

Based on Microsoft's FAQ, the documented sequence is:

1. An unauthenticated attacker sends input that causes Azure Managed Grafana to issue a request to a system the attacker controls.
2. The service's outbound request includes a service access token.
3. The attacker captures that token on their own server.
4. The attacker uses the token to act with whatever permissions were granted to it. No user interaction is required at any step.

The token trust boundary

Azure Managed Grafana consolidates metrics, logs and traces and integrates with Azure services, using Microsoft Entra identity integration and managed identities to reach Azure data stores. For this CVE, the boundary that matters is the service access token described in the FAQ, and the realistic blast radius equals that token's permissions.

The advisory does not identify the token type, its audience, its lifetime, or whether it is a workspace managed identity token. Those details cannot be inferred from the service's general architecture, so we avoid assuming them here.

What has not been disclosed

Microsoft has not published:

• The vulnerable endpoint, parameter or request format
• The underlying source code defect
• Affected regions or tenant boundaries
• Token lifetime or audience
• A reproducible exploitation procedure

The documented outcome is elevation of privilege through the disclosed token's permissions. Remote code execution and full Azure subscription takeover are not documented outcomes for this CVE.

Exploitation status

Microsoft's initial assessment states "Exploited: No", "Publicly disclosed: No", and "Exploitation Less Likely". CVE.now reports no tracked public exploit code and no listing in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. No threat actor, campaign or indicators of compromise have been associated with the CVE. The 9.8 score and the exploitation assessment answer different questions. One describes reachability and potential impact, and the other describes Microsoft's view of exploitability at release. Neither supports the conclusion that the issue is either actively exploited or safe to ignore.

Patch information

What Microsoft shipped

Microsoft fixed CVE-2026-114160 in the November 10, 2026 Security Update Guide release (advisory revision 1.0). Unlike a Windows or Office CVE, there is no KB package and no fixed build number to compare against. Azure Managed Grafana is a managed cloud service, so Microsoft deployed the fix inside its own service. The evidence for the fix appears in three places:

• Remediation Level: Official Fix. The temporal vector includes RL:O, meaning Microsoft considers the vendor fix complete.
• Product status: fixed. The MSRC affected product API lists Azure Managed Grafana with base product version 1.0.0.0 and CPE cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:azure_managed_grafana:*, with product status set to fixed. NVD shows the range as "1.0.0.0 < publication", meaning every service version before the fix date was affected.
• No binaries or build number. The update entry is a "Release Notes" article and a "Security Update" link. The Build Number column is blank, which is normal for a fix deployed inside the service rather than shipped as a file.

The relevant fields from the MSRC records:

"productStatus": "fixed"
"rebootRequired": "No"
"affectedBinaries": []
"customerActionRequired": true

The flag to watch: customerActionRequired

Both the MSRC advisory and the product records set "customerActionRequired":true. Microsoft usually leaves this flag off for cloud-only fixes it rolls out itself. Here it is on, so you should not assume your Grafana workspace was fixed automatically. The available sources do not say what the action is. Check the advisory's linked Release Notes and Security Update entries to confirm your workspace is running the fixed service build.

What the fix has to change

Microsoft has not published code, so the exact change is not public. Fixes for this class of SSRF token leak normally close one or both of these gaps:

1. Destination control: only allow outbound requests to approved endpoints (for example, genuine Azure endpoints), and reject URLs supplied or altered by the user.
2. Credential binding: only attach a token when the request goes to the resource the token was issued for, so a forged destination never receives a bearer credential.

Because the attack needed no privileges (PR:N), the fix also has to stop an unauthenticated request from reaching the code that makes these outbound calls at all.

Related upstream fix (not confirmed to be the same bug)

On October 27, 2026, two weeks before Microsoft's advisory, Grafana Labs published CVE-2026-88967, "Azure Monitor access token disclosure via SSRF". In that bug, a user with query access to an Azure Monitor data source could make Grafana send requests to an attacker's server and leak the data source's Azure access token. It was fixed in Grafana 12.4.14, 13.0.12, 13.1.9 and 13.2.5, and versions below 10.0.0 are listed as unaffected.

The pattern is very similar, but the advisories differ. The upstream bug requires a logged-in user and is scored PR:L with S:C, while Microsoft's is scored PR:N with S:U. Microsoft has not linked the two CVEs, so treat the upstream versions as background and not as the fixed build for Azure Managed Grafana.

Complementary hardening

Microsoft's Azure Managed Grafana security guidance documents general controls. These are hardening measures, and none of them is confirmed as a substitute for the official fix:

• Private connectivity: route traffic through a virtual network using Azure Private Link, and deny public network access when using private endpoints. A private endpoint alone does not replace the separate public access setting.
• Least privilege: assign users and applications the minimum required permissions through Grafana roles and Azure RBAC. This bounds what any leaked credential can do, though the advisory does not identify the exposed token's role.
• Data source authentication: prefer Current User authentication where supported; otherwise use managed identities.
• Diagnostic visibility: stream Grafana login events and other logs to Log Analytics, storage or Event Hubs. No CVE-specific detection signature has been published.

Microsoft documents this portal procedure for disabling public access on an existing workspace (private access requires the Standard tier):

1. Open the Azure Managed Grafana workspace.
2. Select Networking under Settings.
3. Under Public Access, select Disabled.
4. Select Save.

Network restriction and token permissions protect different boundaries. Restricting inbound access governs how clients reach the workspace, and the advisory does not demonstrate that it prevents the vulnerable outbound request. Track remediation status and hardening status separately.

The fix is real and confirmed by the vendor, but there is no public commit, diff or build number. What Microsoft has released is the record of the fix: RL:O, product status fixed, and a flag saying customers need to take action.

Affected systems and versions

• Product: Microsoft Azure Managed Grafana, base product version 1.0.0.0, CPE cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:azure_managed_grafana:*.
• Affected range: NVD records "1.0.0.0 < publication", meaning all service versions prior to the fix deployment.
• Fixed build: none published. The Build Number column in the advisory is blank, and remediation is a service-side deployment with customerActionRequired set to true.
• Scope of attribution: the affected product entries identify the Microsoft-managed service, not every Grafana installation or Grafana Labs' broader portfolio.
• Upstream background only: self-managed Grafana users should separately review CVE-2026-88967, fixed in 12.4.14, 13.0.12, 13.1.9 and 13.2.5 (versions below 10.0.0 unaffected). Microsoft has not linked that CVE to this one.

Vendor security history

Microsoft is a major cloud infrastructure provider. Synergy Research Group's October 29, 2026 report places it behind Amazon and ahead of Google in worldwide cloud infrastructure services, and CRN identifies the same three leaders. Neither source provides Azure Managed Grafana's individual market share or the number of customers affected by this CVE.

The most relevant independent assessment of Microsoft's cloud security record is the Cyber Safety Review Board's review of the 2023 Exchange Online intrusion, which concluded the intrusion was preventable and that Microsoft's security culture was inadequate and required an overhaul. The report describes Storm-0558's possession of a signing key and its access to enterprise Exchange accounts. It recommended fundamental security reforms, greater leadership accountability, and treating security logging as a core cloud capability. That incident involved a different service and mechanism and provides no basis for attributing CVE-2026-114160 to any actor.

On the reform side, Microsoft's July 2026 Secure Future Initiative progress report describes stronger credential protection and lifecycle management, tenant inventory and classification, secure provisioning, and constrained workload identities. Microsoft's Azure Managed Grafana guidance applies the Zero Trust principles "Verify explicitly", "Use least privilege access" and "Assume breach". These are vendor-reported improvements. They are not independent validation that this specific vulnerability has been eliminated in every workspace.

References

• NVD: CVE-2026-114160
• CVE Record: CVE-2026-114160
• Microsoft Security Update Guide: CVE-2026-114160
• MSRC API: affected product record
• MSRC API: vulnerability record
• Grafana Labs advisory: CVE-2026-88967
• MITRE CWE 918: Server Side Request Forgery
• What is Azure Managed Grafana? (Microsoft Learn)
• Set up private access for Azure Managed Grafana (Microsoft Learn)
• Grant users and identities access to Azure Managed Grafana (Microsoft Learn)
• Secure Azure Managed Grafana (Microsoft Learn)
• CVE.now: CVE-2026-114160
• mAlice.ai coverage of CVE-2026-114160
• StackFlag: CVE-2026-114160
• CSRB Review of the Summer 2023 Microsoft Exchange Online Intrusion
• Expanding Microsoft's Secure Future Initiative (Microsoft Security Blog)
• SFI Progress Report July 2026 (Microsoft Trust Center)
• SFI July 2026 report (PDF)
• CRN: Cloud Market Share Q2 2026
• Synergy Research Group: Q3 2026 cloud market report