Automated Threat Modeling

Brief Summary: Unzer Payments CVE-2026-110009, an Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass to Account Takeover

A brief summary of CVE-2026-110009, a critical authentication bypass in the Unzer Payments plugin for WordPress. Unauthenticated attackers can log in as any existing user by submitting that user's email through the Google Pay Express Checkout endpoint.

CVE Analysis

4 min read

Gaurav Sarraf
Gaurav Sarraf

2026-11-18

Brief Summary: Unzer Payments CVE-2026-110009, an Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass to Account Takeover

Introduction

A checkout convenience feature meant to speed up Google Pay purchases turned into a free pass for logging in as any WordPress user, including the site administrator. In the Unzer Payments plugin, an unauthenticated request carrying nothing more than a known email address gets a valid session cookie for that account. A known administrator email therefore means complete site control.

Unzer describes itself as an integrated payment and software ecosystem covering online purchases, in-store point of sale, settlement, and related commerce processes. Its WordPress plugin, published by Unzer Plugins, brings those payment flows into WooCommerce-based stores. Because the plugin processes payments, it typically runs on commerce sites where account takeover has direct financial and operational consequences.

Technical information

The vulnerability is classified as CWE-287 (Improper Authentication) and carries a CVSS 3.1 score of 9.8 with the vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. In plain terms, it is remotely reachable, requires no prior account, needs no user interaction, and can compromise confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

Root cause

The defect sits in the Google Pay Express Checkout flow. The endpoint /?wc-api=google_pay_express is handled by startCheckoutDataWithNormalizedCustomerData. This handler accepts an attacker-controlled paymentData.email value and passes it to createOrGetGuestCustomer().

Instead of treating the submitted email as untrusted input, createOrGetGuestCustomer() resolves it to an existing WordPress user with get_user_by('email', ...). If it finds a matching account, the code calls wp_set_current_user() and wp_set_auth_cookie() for that resolved user ID. The server then issues wordpress_logged_in_* session cookies for whatever account owns the submitted email.

The flow binds a session to that account without checking for any of the following:

  • Verification that the requester controls the email address
  • A password
  • A nonce
  • An authentication token
  • Proof of payment or a signature from the payment provider

The endpoint has no capability check either. The account binding rests entirely on a single attacker-supplied string.

Attack flow

Based on the briefing, the exploitation path is straightforward:

  1. The attacker identifies the email address of an existing user on the target site. Administrator emails are frequently discoverable through the WordPress REST API user enumeration endpoint (/wp-json/wp/v2/users), author archive pages, Gravatar lookups, or contact details in the site footer.
  2. The attacker sends an unauthenticated request to the Google Pay Express Checkout endpoint (/?wc-api=google_pay_express), supplying the targeted email as the paymentData.email value.
  3. The handler resolves that email to the existing user via get_user_by('email', ...) and calls wp_set_current_user() followed by wp_set_auth_cookie() for that user ID.
  4. The server responds with valid wordpress_logged_in_* session cookies for the targeted account.
  5. The attacker now holds an authenticated session for that user. When the targeted account is an administrator, this amounts to full site takeover.

This description follows the effect documented in the advisory, not a tested procedure. No request payloads or exploitation steps are provided here.

Affected systems and versions

The vulnerability affects the Unzer Payments plugin for WordPress in all versions from 0 up to and including 2.2.1. The WordPress plugin listing reports compatibility with WordPress 4.5 or higher and testing through WordPress 7.1.4, and lists 2.2.1 as the current version.

Wordfence reports that no fixed version is known. The WordPress.org listing is marked closed temporarily pending a full review. Active installation counts are listed as unavailable, so the reviewed sources do not support a dependable estimate of how many sites are exposed. The advisory recommends uninstalling the affected plugin and selecting a replacement, and not treating any version as fixed unless the vendor publishes a confirmed security update.

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